Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] eKLR
Parties: Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi
Date Delivered: 2020-07-29
Case Type: Civil
Court: Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa
Judges: None
Citation: Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] eKLR
Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] eKLR
Case Metadata
Case Number:
Petition 5 of 2020
Parties:
Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi, Erick Solonic ole Koyiet, Rosemary Rarienya Omole, Boniface Itevette Lwova, Richard Onyango Kangu, Alphan Mwanyika Chungula & Edward Oyugi v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy
Date Delivered:
29 Jul 2020
Case Class:
Civil
Court:
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa
Case Action:
Judgment
Judge(s):
James Rika
Citation:
Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] eKLR
Advocates:
Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners
Oloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent
Court Division:
Employment and Labour Relations
County:
Mombasa
Advocates:
Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners
Oloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent
Case Summary:
An agreement between an employer and employee was not necessary before an employee’s contract was revised.
Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy
Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa
Petition Number 5 of 2020
J Rika, J
July 29, 2020
Reported by Ribia John
Labour Law -
employment – employment contracts – revision of employment contracts – revision of employment contracts as a result of the Covid 19 pandemic - whether an agreement between an employer and employee was necessary before an employee’s contract was revised - whether the termination of an employee who declined revised terms of employment would amount to constructive dismissal – Employment Act, section 10.
Constitutional Law
– constitutional petitions – capacity to file a constitutional petition – content of a constitutional petition - whether the petitioners had the capacity to institute a constitutional petition - whether the instant petition met the rules and standards set out in the Anarita Karemi Njeru case – Constitution of Kenya, 2010 article 22; Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, rule 21(2)
Constitutional Law
– constitutional petitions – statement of claim – difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim - whether there was any difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim brought under the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016 - whether a constitutional petition could be dismissed by the Employment and Labour Relations Court on grounds that the petition should have been instituted via a statement of claim or vice versa - Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, rule 21(2); Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules, 2016 rule 7.
Brief Facts
The petitioners were teachers employed by the respondent. Following the closure of all schools in Kenya by the Government in the month of March 2020 as a measure of containment of the raging Covid-19 pandemic, the school management convened virtual staff meeting to craft the way forward, to ensure continuity of learning at the respondent.
Among the measures taken was virtual learning. The respondent also classified the petitioners into 3 groups, critical, essential and non-essential staff. The respondent adjusted the salaries of the petitioners downwards from May 2020 to mitigate the losses occasioned by the Covid 19 pandemic. Non-essential staff would have 65% pay-cut, while essential staff would take 45% pay-cut. There was no word on the pay-cut to be taken by the critical category. The petitioners received e-mails asking them to confirm acceptance of pay reduction.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition on grounds that the pay reduction was not commensurate with the fees reduction; the criteria employed in categorization of the teachers was unknown; the selection process was not transparent and did not take into account seniority; the respondent did not clarify if the forfeited salary would be repaid once Covid-19 was eliminated; the duration of the pay adjustment was not clarified, and petitioners would be hampered in working out their obligations with financial institutions. The petitioners further contended that the notice period for adjustment was too short; the decision was made by the respondent without the involvement of the teachers; and the communication did not state which category each teacher fell in, hence causing unnecessary anxiety.
Issues
Whether the applicant had the capacity to institute a constitutional petition.
Whether the instant petition met the rules and standards set out in the
Anarita Karemi Njeru
case.
Whether there was any difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim brought under the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016.
Whether a constitutional petition could be dismissed by the Employment and Labour Relations Court on grounds that the petition should have been instituted via a statement of claim or vice versa.
Whether under section 10 of the Employment Act, an agreement between an employer and employee was necessary before an employee’s contract was revised.
Whether the termination of an employee who declined revised terms of employment would amount to constructive dismissal.
Relevant provisions of the law
Employment Act,
No. 11 of 2007
Section 10 -
Employment particulars
(5) Where any matter stipulated in subsection [1] changes, the employer shall, in consultation with the Employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the employee of change in writing.
Held:
There was no application for contempt placed before the court at the time the last directions issued, on the mode of disposal of the petition, and the application for interim measures. There was no application for contempt transmitted to the court at any time. The Deputy Registrar who transmitted all the other pleadings and documents did not receive any application for contempt.
If indeed there was non-compliance with any order of the court, the petitioners ought to have moved the court to defer all else, in particular, implementation of the orders for disposal of the petition and pursued their application for contempt first. A party accused of contempt had to be given a fair chance to defend the accusations. The petitioners gave the respondent no room at all to respond to contempt allegations. They seemed to have filed their application for contempt very close to the date the court issued final orders on the mode of disposal of the substantive petition, and the date the respondent filed its replying affidavit to the petition.
The further affidavit was filed outside the scope of the orders made on the manner of disposal. It gave no room to the respondent to file any response on the fresh issues raised. No leave was sought from the court. Rule 21[2] of Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 (Mutunga Rules) required that a party who wished to file further information after pleading was closed, to do so with the leave of the court. The correct approach, if the petitioners felt there was need to file further affidavit, or file further information, would have been to seek leave of the court, and seek deferment of the orders issued on disposal of the petition, to allow parties to ventilate intervening disputes. The petitioners had taken too much liberty in filing of their pleadings. They acted in abuse of the process of the court. The respondents had not acted in contempt of the court.
The petitioners had the capacity to file a constitutional petition subject to article 22 of the Constitution. The petitioners did not have to be an association. They did not have to act in combination, or be members, of any interest group or class of persons. They did not have to approach the court in the public interest. Article 22, as well as the Mutunga Rules, and the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016, granted the petitioners a direct ticket to approach the court in seeking protection under the Constitution of Kenya.
Rule 7 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules, 2016, (ELRC Procedure Rules) allowed a person to seek enforcement of any constitutional rights and freedoms or any constitutional provision, in a statement of claim or other suit filed before the court. The procedure in bringing constitutional petitions had been broadened. There were no procedural restrictions, or purist approaches to court. The Mutunga Rules defined a person to include an individual, organization, company, association or any other body of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated. Rule 4 of the Mutunga Rules allowed any person to petition the court, acting in their own interest, or the interest of other persons.
The petitioners had satisfied the standard of precision set under
Anarita Karimi Njeru
. The articles said to have been contravened have been set out in the title to the petition, and given elucidation in the petition. The respondent did not indicate what was imprecise in the petition, and did not call for any particulars from the petitioners prior to the court giving directions on disposal of the petition.
Courts had not placed much distinction between ordinary claims and petitions. Petitions were hardly rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as claims, neither were claims rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as petitions. The claim that the petitioners should have filed a claim, rather than a disguised petition was no longer legally tenable. The legal position expressed in earlier decisions of the instant court, such as
GMV v Bank of Africa
[2013 eKLR] appeared to have shifted due to passage of procedural rules.
Rule 7 of the ELRC Procedure Rules allowed a party to have a constitutional remedy, whether the approach to court was through a petition or a claim. If remedy could be obtained either way, it made no sense to demand that a party approach the court through one procedure over the other. Petitions had become just another mode at the disposal of aggrieved persons, to seek remedies from the court. There was little or no difference, between a petition and a statement of claim, under the ELRC Procedure Rules 2016. The Mutunga Rules stated their overriding objective was access to justice. The Constitution had been transformed into a tool for everyday litigation.
The respondent put in place virtual learning, and understandably, not all teachers could be accommodated in virtual learning. The respondent was compelled to reduce the number of lessons. There was pressure from parents to further reduce fees, which had already recently been reduced. The respondent had no other revenue streams. It was a private institution, unsupported by the Government, sustaining its operations through school fees. It was faced with demands from the staff to retain normal salaries on the one part, and demands from the parents and guardians for further reduction of fees. The respondent was clearly placed between the hammer and the anvil.
The Government had declared the rest of the entire 2020 school calendar, completely wasted by Covid-19. There was no more physical learning in any school. There were no co-curricular activities going on. Where were private Schools expected to finance their wage bills from? The Government had not put in place any substantial relief package to cushion private businesses, against the havoc wrought by the pandemic. There was no program worthy of note from the Government injecting liquidity in the private sector. Private schools were on their own. Teachers’ salaries were not paid in equal ratio to the fees paid by parents. There were other costs in running a school, beyond remuneration of the teachers and other staff. It was illogical for the petitioners to equate percentage of their pay-cut, to the percentage in the school fees reduction. It was impossible for the respondent to predict when the public health problem would be resolved. It could not be said with certainty therefore, when the pay structure would revert to the period before May 2020. The petitioners conceded that Covid-19 had ushered in unpredictable times. They recognized extraordinary steps businesses had been compelled to take, to keep afloat in unpredictable times. Yet, they demanded predictability from the respondent.
There was evidence that consultations took place as required under section 10(5) of the Employment Act before the respondent implemented the pay-cut decision. There were virtual meetings. The decision was not unilateral, but discussed with about 136 employees of the respondent. Only the petitioners had found it necessary to mount a challenge to the decision and the process leading to that decision.
Section 10(5) of the Employment Act did not require that there was agreement on revision of contract between an employer and an employee. The provision did not require that consultation ended up in agreement. All that the employer was required to do in changing terms of the contract was to consult the employee; revise the contract to reflect the change; and notify the employee about the change. The word ‘agreement’ did not feature in section 10(1) of the Employment Act. There would be no requirement for notification, if agreement had already been reached. The employee was free to take the revised contract, or reject it. It was not correct that if the employee declined the revised terms, termination would invariably amount to constructive dismissal.
The petitioners had not resigned. For them to claim under constructive dismissal, they ought to have resigned within a reasonable time of the decision made by the respondent. There was no constructive dismissal without resignation by the employee. The presence of constructive dismissal was tested against facts given by the parties after the employee had resigned. The employer had to be shown to have created an intolerable work environment. The employee must believe that the employer was no longer interested in honouring the contract.
The employer had not created any unbearable work environment; it had been forced to take a decision within the law, by the outbreak of a global pandemic. If there was an unbearable work environment, its creator was nature, not either of the parties. The employer had not been shown to no longer be desirous of upholding the contract of employment. It had bent backwards to retain the employees at work, to sustain the contract in severely difficult economic and public health circumstances. The petitioners were still in employment. The court did not find the respondent to have acted unilaterally or to have been under legal obligation to agree with the petitioners on changing of their terms of service. The changes in the petitioners’ contracts were neither in violation of article 41 of the Constitution, nor section 10(5) of the Employment Act.
The respondent had acted reasonably sustaining 136 employees in employment, instead of taking the approach many employers globally had adopted - mass layoffs. It was imprudent in the circumstances for the petitioners to take the stance of the Shakespearean Shylock and demand unwaveringly for their pound of flesh. Such demands, as Shylock learnt, had the potential for tragic ending. The petitioners ought to be satisfied that they were still in employment, while rendering little or no labour to the respondent.
The pandemic had not spared workplaces, and had made it hard for employers and employees to meet mutual obligations. Many employers had resorted to the contractual doctrines of frustration and force
majeure
, to justify non-performance. Others had opted for termination of contracts. The respondent had taken a softer approach, revising rather than terminating petitioners’ contracts.
Petition dismissed,
the further affidavit sworn by the 1
st
petitioner was irregularly on record and was expunged from the record; no order as to costs.
Extract:
Cases
East Africa
1.
Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic
(No 1) [1979] KLR 154 –(Explained)
2.
Coca Cola East and Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga
Civil Appeal 20 of 2012; [2015] e-KLR
-
(Followed)
3.
GMV v Bank of Africa Kenya Limited
Cause 1227 of 2011;[2013] e-KLR –(Explained)
4.
Kenya Airways v
Wainaina Mbugua
Civil Appeal 107 of 2018; [2019] e-KLR –(Explained)
5.
Kenya Bus Services Limited & 2 others v Attorney- General& 2 others
Miscellanous Civil Suit 413 of 2005; [2005] e-KLR-(Explained)
6.
Kenya County Government Workers Union v Wajir County Government &
another
Petition 38 of 2019[2020] e-KLR –(Explained)
7.
Kenya Game Hunting and Safari Workers Union v Lewa Wildlife Conservancy Limited
Cause 1567 of 2011;[2014]-(Explained)
8.
Kenya Game Hunting and Safari Workers Union v Lewa Wildlife Conservancy Limited
Cause 1567;[2014]-(Explained)
9.
Matiba, Stanley v Attorney-General
Civil Application 42 of 1994; [1998] eKLR-(Explained)
Statutes
East Africa
1. Consitution of Kenya, 2010 articles 22, 23(3); 27; 28; 29; 41; 258 –(Interpreted)
2. Constitution of Kenya [Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Enforcement of the Constitution] Practice and Procedure Rules [Mutunga Rules],2010 (Consitution of Kenya, 2010 Sub Leg) rules 4,21(2)-(Interpreted)
3. Employment Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2011) sections 5,10 (1)(5) –(Interpreted)
4. Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016 (Act No 11 of 2011 Sub Leg) rules 7 –(Interpreted)
Advocates
1.
Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners
2. Oloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent
History Advocates:
Both Parties Represented
Case Outcome:
Petition declined
Disclaimer:
The information contained in the above segment is not part of the judicial opinion delivered by the Court. The metadata has been prepared by Kenya Law as a guide in understanding the subject of the judicial opinion. Kenya Law makes no warranties as to the comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR
RELATIONS COURT AT MOMBASA
PETITION NUMBER 5 OF 2020
IN THE MATTER OF: EMPLOYEES OF JAFFERY ACADEMY, NURSERY/JUNIOR/ SENIOR SCHOOL;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF: THE RIGHTS TO FAIR LABOUR PRACTICES UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF: EMPLOYEES RIGHTS TO EQUALITY AND FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 27 OF THE CONSTITUTION, 2010 AND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT NO 11 OF 2007;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF: FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF: THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA [PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS] PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES, 2013;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF: THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT [PROCEDURE] RULES, 2016;
BETWEEN
1. EMMANUEL WAMBUA MUTHUSI
2. ERICK SOLONIC OLE KOYIET
3. ROSEMARY RARIENYA OMOLE
4. BONIFACE ITEVETTE LWOVA
5. RICHARD ONYANGO KANGU
6. EDWARD OYUGI
7. ALPHAN MWANYIKA CHUNGULA ......................................................................PETITIONERS
VERSUS
KHOJA SHIA ITHNA ASHARI EDUCATION BOARD t/a
JAFFERY ACADEMY ..................................................................................................RESPONDENT
Rika J
Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners
Oloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent
JUDGMENT
PETITION
1. The Petition was filed on 22
nd
May 2020.
2. The Petitioners, are Teachers, employed by the Respondent School.
3. They state, that following the closure of all Schools in Kenya by the Government, in the month of March 2020, as a measure of containment of the raging Covid-19 pandemic, the School Management convened virtual staff meeting to craft the way forward, to ensure continuity of learning at the Respondent School.
4. Among the measures taken, was to train Teachers on use of Google Classroom Application, as a medium of online classes. Online classes went on for 2 weeks without interruption until the School closed.
5. The Petitioners were not equipped with the necessary laptops by the Respondent, but in preparation for the next school term, and in a show of dedication to their calling, invested in their own private internet installations at their homes.
6. The Respondent wrote to the Petitioners on 1
st
April 2020 asking the Petitioners to take annual leave, until 21
st
April 2020. They were advised leave could be extended, depending on the public health situation. They were advised also, to familiarize with Virtual Learning Environment [VLE] program, an alternative to Google Classroom. They were asked to prepare holiday assignments for their Students.
7. When the School reopened, the Petitioners were surprised to learn that they were not on the VLE timetable.
8. On 29
th
April 2020, the acting Head of Senior School, sent out a circular to the Staff advising that ‘
’ April 2020 salary will be paid in full…however we urge you to spend it
wisely… we may be required for business continuity, to adjust the salaries from May 2020.’’
9. The Petitioners were invited to a zoom meeting, to be held on 12
th
May 2020. The agenda was not communicated. At the meeting, the Respondent, categorized Teachers into 3 groups: Critical, Essential and Non-Essential.
10. They were further advised that effective end of May 2020, there would be adjustments to the monthly salaries. Non-Essential Staff would have 65% pay-cut, while Essential Staff would take 45% pay-cut. There was no word on the pay-cut to be taken by the Critical category. The Petitioners received e-mails on 13
th
May 2020, asking them to confirm acceptance of pay reduction.
11. They felt aggrieved, taking into account that: no consultations were made prior to salary reduction; in a letter dated 11
th
May 2020, the Respondent advised Parents and Guardians, that school fees had been reduced by 30% for Nursery School, 25% for Junior School and 20% for Senior School; the pay reduction was not commensurate with the fees reduction; the criteria employed in categorization of the Teachers was unknown; the selection process was not transparent and did not take into account seniority; the Respondent did not clarify if the forfeited salary would be repaid once Covid-19 was eliminated; the duration of the pay adjustment was not clarified, and Petitioners would be hampered in working out their obligations with financial Institutions; the notice period for adjustment was too short; the decision was made by the Board without the involvement of the Teachers; and the communication did not state which category each Teacher fell in, hence causing unnecessary anxiety.
12. The Petitioners state, that the Respondent has violated
Article 41
of the Constitution, which guarantees every Worker fair labour rights, including the right to fair remuneration and reasonable working conditions.
Article 27
entitles the Petitioners to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in economic and social spheres. It also forbids direct or indirect discrimination.
Section 5 of the Employment
Act 2007,
prohibits discrimination at the workplace.
Article 47
entitles everyone, to fair administrative action which is reasonable and lawful. The Respondent was bound to give the Petitioners written reasons for the decision. Article 47 is buttressed by
Section 10 [5] of the Employment Act,
which obligates the Employer to make changes to an Employee’s contract, only in consultation with the Employee. Further, the Petitioners state, their rights to human dignity, under
Article 28
and the right not to be treated in cruel, inhuman or degrading manner under
Article 29,
have been violated.
13. They petition for the following orders
: -
a. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the Respondent’s actions and omissions are a violation of the Petitioners’ rights under Articles 41, 23 [3], 28, 29, and 47 of the Constitution.
b. Damages for violation of the Petitioners’ rights under paragraph [a] above.
c. Such other, or further orders or directions, as the Court may deem fit to grant so as to meet the interest of justice.
d. Costs of the Petition.
14. Contemporaneously, the Petitioners filed an Application for interim measures, as follows: -
a. The Respondent is barred from making unlawful and discriminatory salary adjustments pending hearing of the Application
inter partes
.
b. The Respondent is restrained from directly discriminating the Petitioners in respect of matters arising out of their employment.
15. The Petition and the Application are founded on the Affidavit of Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi, sworn on 22
nd
May 2020.
16. On 16
th
June 2020, the Court directed that the Application and the Petition, be merged, and be considered and determined through Written Submissions. The Application and the Petition seek similar remedies of a substantive nature.
Response
17. The response is mainly contained in the Affidavit sworn by Jonah Safari Alwiga, Head Teacher of the Senior School, on 12
th
June 2020.
18. He explains that the Respondent is a private Educational Institution, comprising Nursery, Primary and Secondary Sections. It has 136 Staff, 87 being Teachers and 49 Support-Staff. The Institution is managed through a Board of Management. It is not profit-oriented. It offers needy Students subsidised fees. All Teachers have separate and severable contracts.
19. In countering Covid-19, Parties engaged, and several suggestions on the way forward were floated, which included: working from home; sending Staff on either paid or unpaid leave; cutting salaries; resort to redundancy or regular termination of the contracts; and imploring of Employees to be reasonable.
20. The Respondent had difficult choices to make, informed by the fact that the existing public health situation is novel. There exists a legal lacuna on how to deal with the novelty.
21. Private Schools such as the Respondent, pay salaries based solely on fees paid by Parents. The critical challenge facing the Respondent is the ability to pay salaries, when there is no normal schooling. Parents and Guardians, agitated for reduction in fees. The Head Teacher exhibits letters from Parents at his School, who made such demands. The Respondent caved in to these demands, and reduced the school fees at 30% for the Nursery, 25% for the Primary, and 20% for the Secondary sections. Parents are demanding further reductions.
22. As pointed out by the 1
st
Petitioner in his Affidavit, the Respondent convened several Staff meetings to discuss continuity of learning. It was agreed online sessions be carried out. All Teachers were trained, and requested to familiarize themselves, with the necessary online platforms. However, these platforms could not accommodate all Teachers due to reduction in workload. The platforms offered 5 lessons compared to the normal 7 lessons a day. Extra or co-curricular activities were suspended.
23. For purely administrative purposes, the Respondent categorized the Teachers into 3 groups: Critical, Essential and Non-Essential. To ensure those without lessons retained their employment, the Respondent asked them to take leave with pay-cut of 65%, while those with virtual lessons took 45% pay-cut. This was done with consultation, between the Parties.
24. Reduction of salary was predicated on reduced income from school fees; unbudgeted costs of virtual learning and ICT infrastructure; unpaid school fees; Parents are not financing VLE even as they agitate for reduction in fees; reduction in number of Students, with the whole of year 13 dropping out due to cancelled international exams, and year 11 is only partially attending; operation costs continue to be incurred irrespective of the closure; and provision for reserve funds, to finance reopening when the public health situation changes, and to finance any preconditions the Government may impose for reopening.
25. The Petitioners’ argument that pay-cut was not commensurate with the percentages in fees reduction is flawed. School fee is not apportioned on a ratio of 1:1 with Staff Salary. The Respondent could not advise on how long the pay-cut would remain in force, as it has no control, on when the pandemic abates or is eliminated. The Respondent should be lauded for bending backwards, to retain the Petitioners in employment, amidst a very difficult situation. Learning was suspended in March 2020, with immediate impact on the economy. The Respondent however only started reducing salaries in May 2020. The Respondent urges the Court to reject the Petition in its totality.
Petitioners’ Submissions
26. The Petitioners submit that the Respondent filed a single Affidavit in response to the Application for Interim Measures, and the Petition. They submit, they filed an Application for Contempt of Court dated 12
th
June 2020. The Application is unopposed.
27. The facts are largely uncontroverted, the Petitioners submit. There is common ground on events surrounding the outbreak of Covid-19.
28. The Petitioners argue that discord started brewing, when the Respondent categorized the Teachers, and imposed pay reduction, based on the categories. There was no consultation. The factors in categorization were not disclosed. The Petitioners were not told which category they fell in. There was no clarity on the duration of the changed pay structure. The Petitioners were hampered in individual financial planning. The notice for pay adjustment was too short. They were discriminated against.
29. They restate that the Articles of Constitution mentioned at paragraph 12 of this Judgment, have been flouted.
30. They submit:
‘’the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic ushered in increasingly turbulent
and unpredictable times across the globe. Here at home, the pandemic has wreaked havoc on the Country’s economy, businesses, and livelihoods of our fellow Countrymen. The sting of the trickledown effect of this crisis has not spared the workplace. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that many existing employment relationships have been adversely affected and it has become very difficult to perform existing contractual obligations.’’
31. Some of the measures taken by Employers in response to the situation, include variation in terms of the contracts. These include, reduction of salary; pay on piece rate basis; withdrawal of benefits; sending Employees on unpaid leave; change in hours of work; transfers; and relocation.
32. It is submitted for the Petitioners, that the Respondent opted for pay-cuts; sending Staff on unpaid leave; and adopting virtual learning. These measures, while good for business sustainability, were a knee jerk reaction, without backing of the law. The Respondent gave a blind eye to fair labour practices, sacrificing Petitioners’ constitutional rights, at the altar of self-preservation. The Respondent has a duty to adhere to the tenets of Article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya and the Employment Act 2007. In particular, the Respondent failed to consult, and
reach an agreement
with the Petitioners, in varying their contracts. The course taken by the Respondent amounts to breach or repudiation of the contracts.
33. Section 10 [5] of the Employment Act requires that where the particulars in any employment contract change, the Employer shall, in consultation with the Employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the Employee of the change in writing. Without agreement, neither Party can lawfully vary the terms of the contract.
34. The Respondent has not tabled before the Court, minutes of any meeting where the Respondent consulted them. Respondent’s decision was unilateral.
35. In
Kenya County Government Workers Union v. Wajir County Government &
Another [2020] e-KLR,
the Court held that the unilateral decision of the Employer to effect salary cut, offends the provision of Section 10[5] of the Employment Act, and amounts to constructive dismissal. The Petitioners urge the Court to take persuasion from this decision, and find that the Respondent’s decision similarly, offends the provision, and violates Article 41 of the Constitution.
36. They were not consulted on categorization of the Staff. The Petitioners recognize that Employers have managerial prerogative to categorize their Employees. The Court in
Kenya Game Hunting and Safari Workers Union v. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy Limited [2014]
acknowledged however, that this principle is subject to reasonable restrictions in a constitutional democracy. Managerial prerogative should not be exercised arbitrarily. The Petitioners were not advised where they lie in the categories created by the Respondent. There was no rationale, for the percentages adopted, in salary cut. They were discriminated against, as they have the same professional qualifications, as their comparators. They teach the same Students. Discrimination at the workplace is unlawful and unconstitutional. The Petitioners cite the decision of this Court in
Aviation and Allied Workers Union v. Kenya Airways Limited & 3 others
[2012] e-KLR
, a decision which has since been overturned by the Court of Appeal, in submitting that consultation at the workplace is a fundamental principle.
37. The Court is prayed to admonish the Respondent and declare that Respondent’s actions, amount to unfair labour practices.
38. On their Application for Contempt of Court, which was not transmitted to the Trial Judge, the Petitioners submit that the Parties recorded a consent order on 5
th
June 2020, restraining the Respondent from discriminating against the Petitioners with regard to matters arising out of their employment. The Respondent disobeyed an order of the Court consensually recorded, by continuing to reduce the Petitioners’ salary by 65%. They expected the consent order to usher in fresh engagement between the Parties, or at worst, result in equalization of the salary cut, at 45% across the board.
39. Using Shakespearean language, the Petitioners submit that consent orders ought to be placed on a higher pedestal than judicially-imposed orders, because in filing consent, Parties tell the Court: ‘’
this is what we both want…we commit to this and you
can hold us to our bond.’’
40. They conclude their Submissions, in Act 3, Scene 3, of Shakespeare’s
Merchant of
Venice
, where Shylock, just like the Petitioners before the Court, emphasizes the need for Parties to be held to their end of a bargain they willingly committed to:
I’ll have my bond, Speak not against my bond.
I have sworn an oath that I will have my bond. I’ll have my bond. I will not hear thee speak.
I’ll have my bond, and therefore speak no more.
Respondent’s Submissions
41. The Respondent submits that the Further Affidavit filed by the Petitioners, is improperly on the record, having been filed without the leave of the Court. It also objects to irregular prosecution of, and submission on, the Application for Contempt, by the Petitioners. It is submitted that the Further Affidavit, and the purported Contempt of Court proceedings, are in violation of the procedural orders issued by the Court on the manner of disposal.
42. On the substantive Petition, the Respondent submits that the Petitioners do not have an absolute right to bring this Petition. They have not met the threshold set out under Rule 4 of Constitution of Kenya [Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Enforcement of the Constitution] Practice and Procedure Rules [Mutunga Rules], as read with Article 258 of the Constitution.
43. The Petitioners are a meagre percentage of the 136 Staff, working for the Respondent. They are Senior School Teachers, with individual and terminable contracts. These contracts were individually negotiated and concluded. Their obligations with the Respondent are individual. They are not covered by any Collective Bargaining Agreement. None comes to Court under the banner of public interest. They are not a distinct class from the other Teachers, nor are they an association acting on behalf of one, or more of its Members. The Petition is misguided. The Petitioners ought to have lodged a Claim.
44. Relying on the Kenyan
locus classicus
Anarita Karimi Njeru v. Republic [1979] e-KLR,
the Respondent submits that a Petitioner should always set out with reasonable degree of precision, that which he complains has been violated, the provision alleged to be violated, and the manner of violation. This decision has been cited with approval in recent cases involving
Kenya Bus Services Limited & 2 others v. Attorney- General
& 2 others [2005] e-KLR
and
Stanley Matiba v. Attorney-General [H.C. Misc. App. No. 666 of 1990
]. It is not enough to allege infringement of the Constitution, without particularizing the details and manner of infringement.
45. The Petitioners are still in employment. They seek to stop deduction of salary which has already been made. They also seek an additional order of unsubstantiated damages. The Respondent relies on the Court of Appeal decision in
Kenya Airways v.
Wainaina Mbugua [2019] e-KLR,
and Industrial Court decision in
GMV v Bank of Africa Kenya Limited [2013] e-KLR
where it was held that, Employees should not seek multiple remedies for the same wrongful act of their Employers. The Petitioners seek specific performance, as well as general damages.
46. The Petitioners’ claim is that the Respondent has breached their respective contracts, pursuant to Section 10 [5] of the Employment Act 2007. Remedy should be pursued from the Employment Act and the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. The Petition is in abuse of the court process.
47. The Respondent has explained in its Replying Affidavit, why it is necessary to have pay-cuts. The reason is valid, not pretextual. The prevailing Covid-19 pandemic affects not only Kenya, but the entire world economy. The Petitioners acknowledge this fact in their Closing Submissions, at paragraph 40 where they submit,
‘’ in closing, the
Petitioners have been candid that they are aware of the challenges brought about by Covid-19 crisis, to the Respondent…’’
They abandon their plea for damages at large, submitting that they seek damages equivalent of their May and June 2020 full salaries.
48. The Respondent has not discriminated against any Teacher. The Parties agreed to a course of action meant to keep the business sustainable, and the Employees at work. It is only the Petitioners who have disputed the propriety of that course of action.
49. The Respondent submits that, there is no Contempt shown in the defective Application of the Petitioners. Courts have held that the standard of proof in contempt proceedings, must be higher than proof on the balance of probability, almost, but not beyond reasonable doubt. The Respondent asks the Court to dismiss the Petition and the Application with costs.
50. The issues as understood by the Court are:
a. Whether there is, a valid Application for Contempt of Court.
b. Whether the Petitioners have capacity to bring the Petition.
c. Whether they have established constitutional or statutory violation to justify reliefs sought.
The Court Finds:
-
51. There was no Application for Contempt placed before the Court, at the time the last directions issued, on the mode of disposal of the Petition, and the Application for Interim Measures
52. There was indeed no Application for Contempt, transmitted to the undersigned Judge at any time. The Deputy Registrar of the Court who transmitted all the other Pleadings and Documents, has at the time of writing this Judgment, confirmed that he did not receive any Application for Contempt.
53. From the Submissions made on the subject however, it is not shown in what way, the Respondent violated the terms of the Consent. Ideally, if indeed there was non-compliance with any order of the Court, the Petitioners ought to have moved the Court to defer all else, in particular, implementation of the orders for disposal of the Petition, and pursue their Application for Contempt first. A Party accused of Contempt, must be given a fair chance to defend the accusations. The Petitioners gave the Respondent no room at all, to respond to Contempt allegations. They seem to have filed their Application for Contempt, very close to the date the Court issued final orders on the mode of disposal of the substantive Petition, and the date the Respondent filed its Replying Affidavit to the Petition.
54. The Further Affidavit similarly appears to have been filed, outside the scope of the Orders made on the manner of disposal. It gave no room to the Respondent, to file any response on the fresh issues raised. No leave was sought from the Court. Rule 21 [2] of Mutunga Rules requires that a Party who wishes to file further information, after pleading is closed, to do so with the leave of the Court. The correct approach, if the Petitioners felt there was need to file Further Affidavit, or file further information, would have been to seek leave of the Court, and seek deferment of the orders issued on disposal of the Petition, to allow Parties ventilate intervening disputes.
55. The Petitioners appear to have taken too much liberty in filing of their Pleadings, with the result that they acted in abuse of the process of the Court.
56. The Court does not find the Respondent to have acted in Contempt of the Court. The Further Affidavit sworn by the 1
st
Petitioner is irregularly on record and is hereby expunged from the record.
57. There is no doubt that the Petitioners have the capacity to bring this Petition. Article 22 of the Constitution states that ‘’
every person has the right to institute court
proceedings, claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or is threatened.’’
58. The Petitioners do not have to be an association. They do not have to act in combination, or be members, of any interest group or class of persons. They do not have to approach the Court in the public interest. The Article, as well as the Mutunga Rules, and the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016, grant the Petitioners a direct ticket to approach the Court in seeking protection under the Constitution of Kenya.
59. Rule 7 of this Court Procedure Rules, allows a person to seek enforcement of any constitutional rights and freedoms or any constitutional provision, in a Statement of Claim or other Suit filed before the Court. The procedure in bringing Constitutional Petitions, has been broadened. There are no procedural restrictions, or purist approaches to Court, such as are opined to exist, by the Respondent
60. The Mutunga Rules define a person to include an individual, organization, company, association or any other body of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated. Rule 4 of the Mutunga Rules allows any person to petition the Court, acting in their own interest, or the interest of other persons.
61. The Petitioners have satisfied the standard of precision set under
Anarita Karimi
Njeru
. The Articles said to have been contravened have been clearly set out in the title to the Petition, and given elucidation in the Petition, as captured at paragraph 12 of this Judgment. The Respondent does not indicate what is imprecise in the Petition, and did not call for any particulars from the Petitioners, prior to the Court giving directions on disposal of the Petition.
62. Should the Petitioners have presented a Claim, instead of a Petition? Courts have not placed much distinction between ordinary Claims and Petitions. Petitions are hardly rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as Claims, neither are Claims rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as Petitions. The submission by the Respondent that the Petitioners should have filed a Claim, rather than a disguised Petition, appears no longer legally tenable. The legal position expressed in earlier decisions of this Court, such as
GMV v Bank of Africa
, cited by the Respondent above, appears to have shifted. This is mainly due to passage of Procedural Rules mentioned at paragraph 53 of this Judgment. Rule 7 of the E&LRC [Procedure] Rules allows a party to have a constitutional remedy, whether the approach to Court is through a Petition or a Claim. If remedy can be obtained either way, it makes no sense to demand that a Party comes to Court, through one procedure over the other. Petitions have become just another mode at the disposal of aggrieved persons, to seek remedies from the Court. There is little or no difference, between a Petition and a Statement of Claim, under the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016. The Mutunga Rules state their overriding objective is access to justice. The Constitution has been transformed into a tool for everyday litigation.
63. Do the facts show statutory or constitutional breach?
64. The facts as agreed by the Parties fall within a very narrow compass. The Petitioners, are Teachers working for the Respondent. In March 2020, the Government of Kenya, in line with World Health Organization guidelines, ordered closure of Schools, and other Public Institutions, as a measure of Covid-19 containment. The Respondent convened virtual staff meetings. The Parties discussed how learning would continue, without placing at risk, the lives of the Learners and their Teachers. These meetings are acknowledged to have taken place by both Parties. It is disconcerting for the Petitioners to submit, that there are no minutes showing that the meetings took place. They acknowledge the meetings took place elsewhere in the Petition and Supporting Affidavit.
65. It was after these meetings, that the Respondent came up with 3 categories of staff: Essential; Non-Essential; and Critical. Essential Staff would have 45% pay reduction, while Non-Essential would have 65% pay reduction, beginning the end of the month of May 2020. There was no word on Critical Staff. The Respondent gave Staff a period of consultation and mental adjustment, between March 2020 when the Government officially shut down parts of the Country and Institutions, and May 2020 when the pay-cut decision was to take effect. There was no knee-jerk reaction.
66. One of the complaints by the Petitioners is that they were not informed which category they fell in. They state however, that they were subjected to 65% pay reduction, which should have answered their question on which category they were placed.
67. The Respondent put in place virtual learning, and understandably, not all Teachers could be accommodated in VLE. The Respondent was compelled to reduce the number of lessons. There was pressure from Parents to further reduce fees, which had already recently been reduced. The Respondent has no other revenue streams. It is a private Institution, unsupported by the Government, sustaining its operations through school fees. It was faced with demands from the Staff to retain normal salaries on the one part, and demands from the Parents and Guardians, for further reduction of fees. The Respondent was clearly placed between the hammer and the anvil.
68. The Court notes that the Government has declared the rest of the entire 2020 school calendar, completely wasted by Covid-19. There is no more physical learning in any School. There are no co-curricular activities going on. Where are private Schools expected to finance their wage bills from? The Government has not put in place any substantial relief package to cushion private businesses, against the havoc wrought by the pandemic. There is no program worthy of note from the Government, injecting liquidity in the private sector. Private Schools are on their own. Teachers’ salaries are not paid in equal ratio to the fees paid by Parents. There are other costs in running a School, beyond remuneration of the Teachers and other Staff. It is illogical for the Petitioners to equate percentage of their pay-cut, to the percentage in the school fees reduction. It is impossible for the Respondent to predict when the public health problem will be resolved. It cannot be said with certainty therefore, when the pay structure will revert to the period before May 2020. The Petitioners concede, as captured at paragraph 30 of this Judgment, that Covid-19 has ushered in unpredictable times. They recognize extraordinary steps businesses have been compelled to take, to keep afloat in unpredictable times. Yet, they demand predictability from the Respondent.
69. There is evidence that consultations took place as required under Section 10 [5] of the Employment Act, before the Respondent implemented the pay-cut decision. There were virtual meetings. The decision was not unilateral, but discussed with about 136 Employees of the Respondent. Only the Petitioners have found it necessary to mount a challenge to the decision and the process leading to that decision.
70. Section 10 [5] does not require that there is agreement on revision of contract, between an Employer and an Employee, as the Petitioners submit. It states, ‘’
Where
any matter stipulated in subsection [1] changes, the Employer shall, in consultation with the Employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the Employee of change in writing.’’
The provision does not require, that consultation ends up in agreement. All that the Employer is required to do, in changing terms of the contract, is to
consult
the Employee;
revise the contract to reflect the change;
and
notify the
Employee about the change.
The word
‘agreement’
does not feature in Section 10 (1) of the Employment Act. There would be no requirement for notification, if agreement has already been reached. The Employee is free to take the revised contract, or reject it. It is not correct that if the Employee declines the revised terms, termination would invariably amount to constructive dismissal. In constructive dismissal, the leading decision is from the Court of Appeal of Kenya, in
Coca Cola East
and Central Africa Limited v. Maria Kagai Ligaga [2015] e-KLR
. The principle, it was held, involves the Employee resigning, as a result of change in fundamental terms of the contract by the Employer, believing that the Employer is no longer desirous of being bound by the terms of the contract. The Petitioners have not resigned. For them to claim under constructive dismissal, they ought to have resigned within a reasonable time of the decision made by the Respondent. There is no constructive dismissal, without resignation by the Employee. The presence of constructive dismissal is tested against facts given by the Parties, after the Employee has resigned. The Employer must be shown to have created an intolerable work environment. The Employee must believe that the Employer is no longer interested in honouring the contract. In this Petition, the Employer has not created any unbearable work environment; it has been forced to take a decision, within the law, by the outbreak of a global pandemic. If there is an unbearable work environment, its creator is nature, not either of the Parties. The Employer has not been shown, to no longer be desirous, of upholding the contract of employment. It has bent backwards to retain the Employees at work, to sustain the contract, in severely difficult economic and public health circumstances. The Petitioners are still in employment. The Court does not find the Respondent, to have acted unilaterally, or to have been under legal obligation to agree with the Petitioners, on changing of their terms of service. The case of
Kenya Local Government Workers
Union,
cited by the Petitioners in their Submissions, relates to salary reduction, which the Court found, was not preceded by consultations. It is distinguishable from the Petition herein. It was a dispute which arose out of contracts of employment prior to the advent of Covid-19. The Employees in that decision, were rendering their labour without interruption, while the Petitioners herein have been impaired in their ability to render normal services to the Respondent. Their productivity is severely inhibited by a natural occurrence. It was not the view of the Court, in the decision cited by the Petitioners above, that Section 10[5] of the Employment Act, requires there is agreement in revision of contracts, between Employers and Employees. The Court emphasized the need for consultations.
71. The changes in the Petitioners’ contracts, are neither in violation of Article 41 of the Constitution, nor Section 10 [5] of the Employment Act.
72. The Respondent has acted reasonably, sustaining 136 Employees in employment, instead of taking the approach many Employers globally, have adopted- mass layoffs. It is imprudent in the circumstances, for the Petitioners to take the stance of the Shakespearean Shylock, and demand unwaveringly, for their pound of flesh. Such demands, as Shylock learnt, have the potential for tragic ending. The Petitioners ought to be satisfied that they are still in employment, while rendering little, or no labour, to the Respondent. As they observe at paragraph 30 above, the pandemic has not spared workplaces, and has made it hard for Employers and Employees to meet mutual obligations. Many Employers have resorted to the contractual doctrines of frustration and
force majeure,
to justify non-performance. Others as observed elsewhere have opted for termination of contracts. The Respondent has taken a softer approach, revising, rather than terminating Petitioners’ contracts.
IT IS ORDERED: -
a. The Petition is declined in its totality.
b. No order on the costs.
Dated, signed and released to the Parties under Covid-19 Judiciary and Ministry of Health Guidelines, at Chaka, Nyeri County, this 29
th
day of July 2020.
James Rika
Judge
Meta Info:
{'Case Number:': 'Petition 5 of 2020', 'Parties:': 'Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi, Erick Solonic ole Koyiet, Rosemary Rarienya Omole, Boniface Itevette Lwova, Richard Onyango Kangu, Alphan Mwanyika Chungula & Edward Oyugi v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy', 'Date Delivered:': '29 Jul 2020', 'Case Class:': 'Civil', 'Court:': 'Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa', 'Case Action:': 'Judgment', 'Judge(s):': 'James Rika', 'Citation:': 'Emmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy [2020] eKLR', 'Advocates:': 'Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners\n\nOloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent', 'Court Division:': 'Employment and Labour Relations', 'County:': 'Mombasa', 'Case Summary:': 'An agreement between an employer and employee was not necessary before an employee’s contract was revised.\n\n\t\xa0\n\nEmmanuel Wambua Muthusi & 6 others v Khoja Shia Ithna Ashari Education Board t/a Jaffery Academy\n\nEmployment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa\n\nPetition Number 5 of 2020\n\nJ Rika, J\n\nJuly 29, 2020\n\nReported by Ribia John \n\n\t\xa0\n\n\t\xa0\n\nLabour Law - employment – employment contracts – revision of employment contracts – revision of employment contracts as a result of the Covid 19 pandemic - whether an agreement between an employer and employee was necessary before an employee’s contract was revised - whether the termination of an employee who declined revised terms of employment would amount to constructive dismissal – Employment Act, section 10.\n\nConstitutional Law – constitutional petitions – capacity to file a constitutional petition – content of a constitutional petition - whether the petitioners had the capacity to institute a constitutional petition - whether the instant petition met the rules and standards set out in the Anarita Karemi Njeru case – Constitution of Kenya, 2010 article 22; Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, rule 21(2) \n\nConstitutional Law – constitutional petitions – statement of claim – difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim - whether there was any difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim brought under the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016 - whether a constitutional petition could be dismissed by the Employment and Labour Relations Court on grounds that the petition should have been instituted via a statement of claim or vice versa - Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, rule 21(2); Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules, 2016 rule 7. \n\n\t\xa0\n\nBrief Facts\n\n\tThe petitioners were teachers employed by the respondent. Following the closure of all schools in Kenya by the Government in the month of March 2020 as a measure of containment of the raging Covid-19 pandemic, the school management convened virtual staff meeting to craft the way forward, to ensure continuity of learning at the respondent.\n\n\tAmong the measures taken was virtual learning. The respondent also classified the petitioners into 3 groups, critical, essential and non-essential staff. The respondent adjusted the salaries of the petitioners downwards from May 2020 to mitigate the losses occasioned by the Covid 19 pandemic. Non-essential staff would have 65% pay-cut, while essential staff would take 45% pay-cut. There was no word on the pay-cut to be taken by the critical category. The petitioners received e-mails asking them to confirm acceptance of pay reduction.\n\n\tAggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition on grounds that the pay reduction was not commensurate with the fees reduction; the criteria employed in categorization of the teachers was unknown; the selection process was not transparent and did not take into account seniority; the respondent did not clarify if the forfeited salary would be repaid once Covid-19 was eliminated; the duration of the pay adjustment was not clarified, and petitioners would be hampered in working out their obligations with financial institutions. The petitioners further contended that the notice period for adjustment was too short; the decision was made by the respondent without the involvement of the teachers; and the communication did not state which category each teacher fell in, hence causing unnecessary anxiety.\n\nIssues\n\n\n\t\tWhether the applicant had the capacity to institute a constitutional petition.\n\n\t\tWhether the instant petition met the rules and standards set out in the Anarita Karemi Njeru case.\n\n\t\tWhether there was any difference between a constitutional petition and a statement of claim brought under the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016.\n\n\t\tWhether a constitutional petition could be dismissed by the Employment and Labour Relations Court on grounds that the petition should have been instituted via a statement of claim or vice versa.\n\n\t\tWhether under section 10 of the Employment Act, an agreement between an employer and employee was necessary before an employee’s contract was revised.\xa0\n\n\t\tWhether the termination of an employee who declined revised terms of employment would amount to constructive dismissal.\n\n\n\t\xa0\n\nRelevant provisions of the law\n\nEmployment Act, No. 11 of 2007\n\nSection 10 - Employment particulars\n\n(5) Where any matter stipulated in subsection [1] changes, the employer shall, in consultation with the Employee, revise the contract to reflect the change and notify the employee of change in writing.\n\n\t\xa0\n\nHeld:\n\n\n\t\tThere was no application for contempt placed before the court at the time the last directions issued, on the mode of disposal of the petition, and the application for interim measures. There was no application for contempt transmitted to the court at any time. The Deputy Registrar who transmitted all the other pleadings and documents did not receive any application for contempt.\n\n\t\tIf indeed there was non-compliance with any order of the court, the petitioners ought to have moved the court to defer all else, in particular, implementation of the orders for disposal of the petition and pursued their application for contempt first. A party accused of contempt had to be given a fair chance to defend the accusations. The petitioners gave the respondent no room at all to respond to contempt allegations. They seemed to have filed their application for contempt very close to the date the court issued final orders on the mode of disposal of the substantive petition, and the date the respondent filed its replying affidavit to the petition.\n\n\t\tThe further affidavit was filed outside the scope of the orders made on the manner of disposal. It gave no room to the respondent to file any response on the fresh issues raised. No leave was sought from the court. Rule 21[2] of Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 (Mutunga Rules) required that a party who wished to file further information after pleading was closed, to do so with the leave of the court. The correct approach, if the petitioners felt there was need to file further affidavit, or file further information, would have been to seek leave of the court, and seek deferment of the orders issued on disposal of the petition, to allow parties to ventilate intervening disputes. The petitioners had taken too much liberty in filing of their pleadings. They acted in abuse of the process of the court.\xa0 The respondents had not acted in contempt of the court.\n\n\t\tThe petitioners had the capacity to file a constitutional petition subject to article 22 of the Constitution. The petitioners did not have to be an association. They did not have to act in combination, or be members, of any interest group or class of persons. They did not have to approach the court in the public interest. Article 22, as well as the Mutunga Rules, and the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016, granted the petitioners a direct ticket to approach the court in seeking protection under the Constitution of Kenya.\n\n\t\tRule 7 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules, 2016, (ELRC Procedure Rules) allowed a person to seek enforcement of any constitutional rights and freedoms or any constitutional provision, in a statement of claim or other suit filed before the court. The procedure in bringing constitutional petitions had been broadened. There were no procedural restrictions, or purist approaches to court. The Mutunga Rules defined a person to include an individual, organization, company, association or any other body of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated. Rule 4 of the Mutunga Rules allowed any person to petition the court, acting in their own interest, or the interest of other persons.\n\n\t\tThe petitioners had satisfied the standard of precision set under Anarita Karimi Njeru. The articles said to have been contravened have been set out in the title to the petition, and given elucidation in the petition. The respondent did not indicate what was imprecise in the petition, and did not call for any particulars from the petitioners prior to the court giving directions on disposal of the petition.\n\n\t\tCourts had not placed much distinction between ordinary claims and petitions. Petitions were hardly rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as claims, neither were claims rejected on the ground that they should have been presented as petitions. The claim that the petitioners should have filed a claim, rather than a disguised petition was no longer legally tenable. The legal position expressed in earlier decisions of the instant court, such as GMV v Bank of Africa [2013 eKLR] appeared to have shifted due to passage of procedural rules.\n\n\t\tRule 7 of the ELRC Procedure Rules allowed a party to have a constitutional remedy, whether the approach to court was through a petition or a claim. If remedy could be obtained either way, it made no sense to demand that a party approach the court through one procedure over the other. Petitions had become just another mode at the disposal of aggrieved persons, to seek remedies from the court. There was little or no difference, between a petition and a statement of claim, under the ELRC Procedure Rules 2016. The Mutunga Rules stated their overriding objective was access to justice. The Constitution had been transformed into a tool for everyday litigation.\n\n\t\tThe respondent put in place virtual learning, and understandably, not all teachers could be accommodated in virtual learning. The respondent was compelled to reduce the number of lessons. There was pressure from parents to further reduce fees, which had already recently been reduced. The respondent had no other revenue streams. It was a private institution, unsupported by the Government, sustaining its operations through school fees. It was faced with demands from the staff to retain normal salaries on the one part, and demands from the parents and guardians for further reduction of fees. The respondent was clearly placed between the hammer and the anvil.\n\n\t\tThe Government had declared the rest of the entire 2020 school calendar, completely wasted by Covid-19. There was no more physical learning in any school. There were no co-curricular activities going on. Where were private Schools expected to finance their wage bills from? The Government had not put in place any substantial relief package to cushion private businesses, against the havoc wrought by the pandemic. There was no program worthy of note from the Government injecting liquidity in the private sector. Private schools were on their own. Teachers’ salaries were not paid in equal ratio to the fees paid by parents. There were other costs in running a school, beyond remuneration of the teachers and other staff. It was illogical for the petitioners to equate percentage of their pay-cut, to the percentage in the school fees reduction. It was impossible for the respondent to predict when the public health problem would be resolved. It could not be said with certainty therefore, when the pay structure would revert to the period before May 2020. The petitioners conceded that Covid-19 had ushered in unpredictable times. They recognized extraordinary steps businesses had been compelled to take, to keep afloat in unpredictable times. Yet, they demanded predictability from the respondent.\n\n\t\tThere was evidence that consultations took place as required under section 10(5) of the Employment Act before the respondent implemented the pay-cut decision. There were virtual meetings. The decision was not unilateral, but discussed with about 136 employees of the respondent. Only the petitioners had found it necessary to mount a challenge to the decision and the process leading to that decision.\n\n\t\tSection 10(5) of the Employment Act did not require that there was agreement on revision of contract between an employer and an employee. The provision did not require that consultation ended up in agreement. All that the employer was required to do in changing terms of the contract was to consult the employee; revise the contract to reflect the change; and notify the employee about the change. The word ‘agreement’ did not feature in section 10(1) of the Employment Act. There would be no requirement for notification, if agreement had already been reached. The employee was free to take the revised contract, or reject it. It was not correct that if the employee declined the revised terms, termination would invariably amount to constructive dismissal.\n\n\t\tThe petitioners had not resigned. For them to claim under constructive dismissal, they ought to have resigned within a reasonable time of the decision made by the respondent. There was no constructive dismissal without resignation by the employee. The presence of constructive dismissal was tested against facts given by the parties after the employee had resigned. The employer had to be shown to have created an intolerable work environment. The employee must believe that the employer was no longer interested in honouring the contract.\n\n\t\tThe employer had not created any unbearable work environment; it had been forced to take a decision within the law, by the outbreak of a global pandemic. If there was an unbearable work environment, its creator was nature, not either of the parties. The employer had not been shown to no longer be desirous of upholding the contract of employment. It had bent backwards to retain the employees at work, to sustain the contract in severely difficult economic and public health circumstances. The petitioners were still in employment. The court did not find the respondent to have acted unilaterally or to have been under legal obligation to agree with the petitioners on changing of their terms of service. The changes in the petitioners’ contracts were neither in violation of article 41 of the Constitution, nor section 10(5) of the Employment Act.\n\n\t\tThe respondent had acted reasonably sustaining 136 employees in employment, instead of taking the approach many employers globally had adopted - mass layoffs. It was imprudent in the circumstances for the petitioners to take the stance of the Shakespearean Shylock and demand unwaveringly for their pound of flesh. Such demands, as Shylock learnt, had the potential for tragic ending. The petitioners ought to be satisfied that they were still in employment, while rendering little or no labour to the respondent.\n\n\t\tThe pandemic had not spared workplaces, and had made it hard for employers and employees to meet mutual obligations. Many employers had resorted to the contractual doctrines of frustration and force majeure, to justify non-performance. Others had opted for termination of contracts. The respondent had taken a softer approach, revising rather than terminating petitioners’ contracts.\n\n\nPetition dismissed, the further affidavit sworn by the 1st petitioner was irregularly on record and was expunged from the record; no order as to costs.', 'Extract:': 'Cases\n\nEast Africa\n\n 1.\xa0\xa0 Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No 1) [1979] KLR 154 –(Explained)\n\n 2.\xa0\xa0 Coca Cola East and Central Africa Limited v Maria Kagai Ligaga Civil Appeal 20 of 2012; [2015] e-KLR- (Followed)\n\n 3.\xa0\xa0 GMV v Bank of Africa Kenya Limited Cause 1227 of 2011;[2013] e-KLR –(Explained)\n\n 4.\xa0\xa0 Kenya Airways v Wainaina Mbugua Civil Appeal 107 of 2018; [2019] e-KLR –(Explained)\n\n 5.\xa0\xa0\xa0 Kenya Bus Services Limited & 2 others v Attorney- General& 2 others Miscellanous Civil Suit 413 of 2005; [2005] e-KLR-(Explained)\n\n 6.\xa0\xa0 Kenya County Government Workers Union v Wajir County Government & another Petition 38 of 2019[2020] e-KLR –(Explained)\n\n 7.\xa0\xa0 Kenya Game Hunting and Safari Workers Union v Lewa Wildlife Conservancy Limited Cause 1567 of 2011;[2014]-(Explained)\n\n 8.\xa0\xa0 Kenya Game Hunting and Safari Workers Union v Lewa Wildlife Conservancy Limited Cause 1567;[2014]-(Explained)\n\n 9.\xa0\xa0 Matiba, Stanley v Attorney-General Civil Application 42 of 1994; [1998] eKLR-(Explained)\n\nStatutes\n\nEast Africa\n\n 1.\xa0\xa0 Consitution of Kenya, 2010 articles 22, 23(3); 27; 28; 29; 41; 258 –(Interpreted)\n\n 2.\xa0\xa0 Constitution of Kenya [Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Enforcement of the Constitution] Practice and Procedure Rules [Mutunga Rules],2010 (Consitution of Kenya, 2010 Sub Leg) rules 4,21(2)-(Interpreted)\n\n 3.\xa0\xa0 Employment Act, 2007 (Act No 11 of 2011) sections 5,10 (1)(5) –(Interpreted)\n\n 4.\xa0\xa0 Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules 2016 (Act No 11 of 2011 Sub Leg) rules 7 –(Interpreted)\n\nAdvocates\n\n1. Onyango Onunga & Company, Advocates for the Petitioners\n\n 2. Oloo & Chatur Advocates for the Respondent', 'History Advocates:': 'Both Parties Represented', 'Case Outcome:': 'Petition declined', 'Disclaimer:': 'The information contained in the above segment is not part of the judicial opinion delivered by the Court. The metadata has been prepared by Kenya Law as a guide in understanding the subject of the judicial opinion. Kenya Law makes no warranties as to the comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information'}